Nicolas
bbd9afe8aa
L'admin etait une 2e app front Vite independante (apps/admin-web, port 5174,
Dockerfile nginx, service compose dedie, job CI propre) non demandee. Toute
l'UI passe dans apps/web sous le prefixe /admin ; seul le frontend est
fusionne, l'authentification admin reste entierement separee.
Front (apps/web/src) :
- pages -> pages/admin/{login,dashboard,monitoring,corrections,catalog}/,
layout -> layouts/AdminLayout.tsx, contexte + garde -> features/admin/.
- client API -> api/admin-client.ts : classe AdminApiError (evite la
collision avec ApiError), lit VITE_API_URL (plus de VITE_ADMIN_API_URL).
- routes /admin/* dans App.tsx, enveloppees d'AdminAuthProvider +
RequireAdmin -> le probe GET /admin/auth/me ne tourne que sous /admin.
- reutilise l'i18n, lib/zod-errors, services/error-message.service et le
theme SCSS de apps/web ; bloc i18n admin.* fusionne dans la locale fr
(les cles errors etaient deja toutes presentes).
- corrige une race dans CatalogPage (reponse d'un onglet precedent qui
ecrasait l'onglet courant, exposee par le double-mount StrictMode) via
un ref requestSeq.
Auth admin inchangee : table AdminUser, cookie admin_session,
ADMIN_JWT_SECRET, script create-admin.ts.
Infra :
- docker-compose : service admin-web + ADMIN_WEB_PORT supprimes (l'app
`app` sert deja le front construit).
- ADMIN_CORS_ORIGIN retire (meme origine) : env.ts, app.ts, .env.example.
- job CI "Run admin-web E2E tests" supprime ; les specs admin-* tournent
dans le job web (apps/web/cypress/e2e/admin-*.{cy.ts,feature}).
- apps/api/.env.example : ajout ADMIN_JWT_SECRET / ADMIN_INITIAL_*.
- recharts ajoute a apps/web ; pnpm-lock regenere.
- specs/backend-architecture.md : section admin mise a jour.
Verifie : biome + tsc -b (web/api) + pnpm -r build verts ; Cypress web
102/103 (l'unique echec est le flake pre-existant recipe-form.feature
"Preloads ..." de clipping headless, sans rapport) ; 16/16 specs admin ;
45/45 composants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
61 lines
3.1 KiB
Text
61 lines
3.1 KiB
Text
# Used by docker-compose.yml to provision the local Postgres container.
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# Pick your own values — do not reuse these across environments, and never
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# commit the real .env (it's git-ignored).
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POSTGRES_USER=changeme
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=changeme
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POSTGRES_DB=batchcooking
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POSTGRES_PORT=5432
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# Used by docker-compose.yml's "app" service (Docker-only — the native
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# `pnpm dev:api` workflow reads apps/api/.env instead, set both when using
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# both workflows). Required, no default on purpose — generate your own.
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JWT_SECRET=changeme-generate-a-real-random-secret-at-least-32-chars
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# Optional — host port for the Docker review stack's single app container
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# (docker-compose.yml), serving both the API and the built frontend.
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# APP_PORT=3000
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# --- Admin surface (apps/web's /admin/* routes + the /admin/* API) --------
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# All optional: an instance that doesn't run the admin app needs none of
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# these. `requireAdmin` fails closed when ADMIN_JWT_SECRET is unset, so
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# leaving it out simply disables every /admin/* route. The admin UI is
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# served by the same app/container as the rest of the frontend — no
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# separate origin, so no CORS entry of its own.
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#
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# Secret for the admin session JWT — MUST be different from JWT_SECRET so an
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# end-user token can never be replayed against /admin/*. Generate your own
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# the same way as JWT_SECRET above.
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# ADMIN_JWT_SECRET=changeme-generate-a-real-random-secret-at-least-32-chars
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# Optional — read only by `src/scripts/create-admin.ts` when its --email /
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# --password / --name flags are omitted (e.g. to bootstrap the first admin
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# from inside the container). Never read by the running server.
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# ADMIN_INITIAL_EMAIL=ops@example.com
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# ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD=changeme-at-least-8-chars
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# ADMIN_INITIAL_NAME=Ops
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# Optional — only set this to false if THIS deployment is served over
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# plain HTTP (no TLS in front of it). Left unset, the session cookie
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# requires HTTPS (Secure attribute) as it should for a real deployment;
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# over plain HTTP a Secure cookie is silently never sent back by the
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# browser, so login "succeeds" but every subsequent request 401s.
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# COOKIE_SECURE=false
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# Required — secret shared between "app" and "tech-step-intent-service"
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# (docker-compose.yml, apps/api/src/config/env.ts). Unlike
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# INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET below, there's no "leave it unset" escape hatch:
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# tech-step-intent-service is a core dependency, not an optional background
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# job — without it, no recipe step can have its techniques detected at all.
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# Generate your own the same way as JWT_SECRET above.
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INTENT_SERVICE_SECRET=changeme-generate-a-real-random-secret-at-least-32-chars
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# Only needed to run the optional `tech-step-llm-worker` service — shared
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# between it and "app" (docker-compose.yml). Generate your own the same
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# way as JWT_SECRET above; leave both this and the service commented
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# out/unset to run without it.
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# INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET=changeme-generate-a-real-random-secret-at-least-32-chars
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# Optional — cron expression (node-cron syntax) the worker wakes up on to
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# run its audit/feedback-loop jobs. Default: weekly, Sunday 03:00 — a
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# provisional floor, not a calibrated value (see
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# services/tech-step-llm-worker/README.md).
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# TECH_STEP_WORKER_CRON=0 3 * * 0
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