batchCooking/apps/api/src/config/env.ts
Nicolas 5e478188a2
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fix(api): autorise l'origine WebView Capacitor dans CORS_ORIGIN
L'app Android n'arrivait a se logger/inscrire nulle part (204 +
"erreur inattendue" cote client) : CORS_ORIGIN n'etait jamais defini en
prod (docker-compose.yml ne le passe pas a `app`), donc il retombait
sur son default `http://localhost:5173` (le serveur Vite de dev), qui
ne matche evidemment jamais l'origine reelle de l'appli packagee
(`https://localhost`, cf. capacitor.config.ts). Le site web n'est lui
jamais touche : il est servi depuis la meme origine que l'API en prod,
donc jamais de preflight CORS du tout sur /auth/*.

Le symptome trompeur vient du package `cors` : un preflight OPTIONS
recoit toujours 204, meme pour une origine rejetee — la difference
invisible sans inspecter les headers est l'absence de
Access-Control-Allow-Origin, qui fait ensuite bloquer le vrai POST
cote client sans jamais atteindre le serveur. Vu depuis les logs
serveur, la route a bien l'air "appelee" (le preflight matche le meme
chemin) alors que /auth/login lui-meme n'est jamais reellement recu.

CORS_ORIGIN devient une liste separee par des virgules (le type
`ExpressServerCoreOptions.corsOrigin` acceptait deja `string | string[]`)
et son default inclut desormais `https://localhost` — l'origine de
l'appli packagee est fixe et non secrete (contrairement au domaine du
site en prod, qui n'a de toute facon pas besoin d'etre dans cette
liste puisqu'il est same-origin), donc la coder en dur dans le default
couvre tout deploiement sans configuration supplementaire.

Verifie en local : script ad hoc qui demarre le vrai `createServer()`
et envoie un preflight OPTIONS /auth/login avec differentes origines —
`https://localhost` et `http://localhost:5173` recoivent maintenant
Access-Control-Allow-Origin, une origine arbitraire non listee
continue de ne pas le recevoir (pas de bypass en wildcard). Egalement
`pnpm --filter api exec tsc --noEmit` et `pnpm exec biome check` sur
les fichiers touches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 08:22:49 +02:00

149 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript

import dotenv from "dotenv";
import { z } from "zod";
// Loads `.env.test` instead of `.env` when running the test suite
// (NODE_ENV=test, set by `cross-env` in package.json's `test` script —
// already present in `process.env` by the time this module runs, since
// `cross-env` sets it before invoking node/tsx at all). Keeps
// `resetDatabase()` (test-support/reset-db.ts, which TRUNCATEs almost
// every table before each test) pointed at a dedicated test database,
// never whatever `pnpm dev` actually uses — running the test suite once
// already wiped a real local dev database this way (`.env`/`.env.test`
// sharing one `DATABASE_URL`), see `.env.test.example` for how to set the
// separate test database this now requires.
dotenv.config({ path: process.env.NODE_ENV === "test" ? ".env.test" : ".env" });
/**
* Schema for every environment variable the API reads. Parsing (below)
* fails fast at startup if something required is missing/invalid, instead
* of surfacing as a confusing runtime error later.
*/
const envSchema = z.object({
/** Runtime mode — also toggles test-only behavior (e.g. cheaper argon2 cost, see auth.service.ts). */
NODE_ENV: z.enum(["development", "test", "production"]).default("development"),
/** Port the HTTP server listens on. */
PORT: z.coerce.number().int().positive().default(3000),
/** Postgres connection string, consumed by Prisma. */
DATABASE_URL: z.string().url().optional(),
// Auth — no default on purpose, same reasoning as docker-compose.yml's
// POSTGRES_USER/PASSWORD: a secret must never have a working fallback
// baked into committed code.
/** Secret used to sign/verify session JWTs. Required, no default — see comment above. */
JWT_SECRET: z.string().min(32, "JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 characters"),
/** JWT expiry, in `jsonwebtoken`'s duration string format (e.g. "7d"). */
JWT_EXPIRES_IN: z.string().default("7d"),
/** Name of the httpOnly cookie carrying the session JWT. */
AUTH_COOKIE_NAME: z.string().default("session"),
/**
* Origin(s) allowed by CORS, comma-separated — parsed below into a
* `string[]` for `ExpressServerCoreOptions.corsOrigin`
* (`app.ts`/`express-server.ts`, which passes it straight to the `cors`
* package) and reused as-is for the Socket.IO handshake's own CORS config
* (`server.ts`, which needs its own since the WS upgrade never runs
* through `setupCore`'s middleware).
*
* Must always include `https://localhost`: the packaged Android app's
* WebView is served from exactly that fixed origin (Capacitor's default
* for `androidScheme`/hostname — see `apps/web/capacitor.config.ts`'s own
* doc comment), and every request it makes to this API — `/auth/login`
* and `/auth/signup` included — is genuinely cross-origin, unlike
* apps/web's *browser* build, which is served from the very same origin
* as this API in production (see docker-compose.yml's `app` service) and
* so never needs an entry here at all. Missing this origin doesn't fail
* loudly: the `cors` package still answers a preflight `OPTIONS` with 204
* for an origin it's about to reject (it only *omits*
* `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`), so the request the app's WebView logs
* looks identical to a normal one right up until the browser silently
* drops the real `POST` — surfacing client-side as a generic "unexpected
* error" with no 401/403 anywhere to point at the actual cause. Default
* covers both the Vite dev server and the packaged app out of the box; a
* real deployment's own web origin (e.g. a production domain) never needs
* adding here for the reason above, but the env var still allows
* extending/overriding this list (comma-separated) if that ever changes.
*/
CORS_ORIGIN: z
.string()
.default("http://localhost:5173,https://localhost")
.transform((value) =>
value
.split(",")
.map((origin) => origin.trim())
.filter((origin) => origin.length > 0),
),
/**
* Absolute path to the built frontend (`apps/web/dist`), to serve
* alongside the API. Optional, no default — only set inside the
* production Docker image (see Dockerfile); left unset in native dev
* (`pnpm dev:api`), where `pnpm dev:web`'s own Vite dev server serves
* the frontend instead.
*/
FRONTEND_DIST_DIR: z.string().optional(),
/**
* Overrides whether the session cookie gets the `Secure` attribute
* (HTTPS-only — see auth.routes.ts). Independent from NODE_ENV on
* purpose: NODE_ENV=production doesn't imply the deployment actually
* has TLS in front of it (e.g. an HTTP-only dev/staging instance), and
* a `Secure` cookie is silently never sent back by the browser over
* plain HTTP — every authenticated request 401s despite login
* succeeding, with no error to point at the cause. Unset (the default)
* falls back to NODE_ENV === "production", same as before this existed.
* Empty string counts as unset too, so `${COOKIE_SECURE:-}` in
* docker-compose.yml doesn't force it to `false` when not provided.
*/
COOKIE_SECURE: z
.string()
.optional()
.transform((value) => (value === undefined || value === "" ? undefined : value === "true")),
/**
* Shared secret `services/tech-step-llm-worker` sends as an
* `X-Internal-Worker-Secret` header on every call to `/internal/tech-steps/*`
* (`requireInternalWorker`, `middlewares/require-internal-worker.ts`).
* Optional with no default in the schema itself (unlike `JWT_SECRET`) so
* an environment that doesn't run the worker at all (e.g. this repo's
* existing test suite) never needs to set it — but `requireInternalWorker`
* itself rejects every request outright when it's unset, so the surface
* fails closed rather than open if a real deployment forgets to set it.
*/
INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET: z.string().min(32).optional(),
/**
* Base URL of `services/tech-step-intent-service` (the spaCy-based
* microservice `TechStepClassifierService` delegates NER + intent
* classification to, see `lib/recipe-matching/intent-service-client.ts`).
* Has a default (unlike `DATABASE_URL`/secrets below) since it isn't
* secret and dev natively runs it on a fixed local port — Docker Compose
* overrides it to the compose network's service name.
*/
INTENT_SERVICE_BASE_URL: z.string().url().default("http://localhost:8000"),
/**
* Shared secret sent as an `X-Intent-Service-Secret` header on every call
* to `services/tech-step-intent-service`. Unlike `INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET`
* above, **required, no `.optional()`** — that service is a core
* dependency (recipe save/preview can no longer detect any technique
* without it), not an optional background job; an environment that
* forgets to set this must fail loudly at startup, not silently run with
* every technique detection request failing one at a time.
*/
INTENT_SERVICE_SECRET: z.string().min(32, "INTENT_SERVICE_SECRET must be at least 32 characters"),
/**
* Secret used to sign/verify the **admin** session JWT (`lib/admin-jwt.ts`)
* — entirely separate from `JWT_SECRET`, so an end-user session token can
* never be replayed against `/admin/*` and vice versa. `.optional()`
* (unlike `JWT_SECRET`): an instance that doesn't run the admin app at
* all never needs it — but `requireAdmin` (`middlewares/require-admin.ts`)
* rejects every request outright when it's unset, so the surface fails
* closed, same posture as `INTERNAL_WORKER_SECRET`.
*/
ADMIN_JWT_SECRET: z
.string()
.min(32, "ADMIN_JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 characters")
.optional(),
/** Name of the httpOnly cookie carrying the admin session JWT — must differ from `AUTH_COOKIE_NAME` so the two sessions coexist in one browser. */
ADMIN_COOKIE_NAME: z.string().default("admin_session"),
/** Optional seed values read by `src/scripts/create-admin.ts` when its `--email`/`--password`/`--name` flags are omitted — never used by the running server. */
ADMIN_INITIAL_EMAIL: z.string().optional(),
ADMIN_INITIAL_PASSWORD: z.string().optional(),
ADMIN_INITIAL_NAME: z.string().optional(),
});
/** Parsed, validated environment — import this instead of reading `process.env` directly anywhere else. */
export const env = envSchema.parse(process.env);